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THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM ACT: A
MEASURED STEP TO LIMIT THE PAC's
ROLE IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
INTRODUCTION

The first session of the 98th Congress saw more than a score of bills
introduced which address congressional campaign financing. Representative David Obey (D-Wis.), a long time advocate of congressional
campaign financing reform,' leads the bipartisan coalition sponsoring
two of the more comprehensive bills.2 Both bills include an aggregate
limit on candidate expenditures, an aggregate limit on contributions
from political action committees (PAC's),3 and free reply time for
targets of independent expenditures. While the Clean Campaign Act
of 1983' advocates a voluntary system of mixed private and public financing, the Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act of 19831
provides for a 100% tax credit for contributions of $100 or less made by
individuals to a qualified candidate.
The need for effective control presses. Estimates for PAC candidate
contributions to 1984 congressional campaigns reach $100 million.6
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

In 1979, Rep. Obey, D-Wis., along with then Rep. Tom Railsback, R-Ill., sponsored the
Campaign Contribution Reform Bill, H.R. 4970, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), which provided for limits on PAC contributions to congressional campaigns. The bill passed the
House on October 17, 1979 by a vote of 217 to 198, 125 CONG. REC. H9303-04 (daily ed. Oct.
17, 1979), but opponents stalled it in the Senate with a threatened filibuster. Weaver, Senate
Bottles up a Bill to Limit Contributions in Racesfor House, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1980, at 20,
col. 3.
Rep. Obey, D-Wis., and 71 co-sponsors introduced the Clean Campaign Act of 1983 on
April 12, 1983. H.R. 2490, 98th Cong., IstSess., 129 CONG. REC. H 1992 (daily ed. Apr. 12,
1983). Despite accumulating 58 more co-sponsors, raising the total to 130, considerable opposition to the public financing portion of that bill was certain to preclude its passage. Farney & Hunt, Backers of Public Fundingof House Races Drop ldea, Will Seek New Curbs on
PAC's, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1983, at 6, col. 1. Rep. Obey, with 100 co-sponsors in support,
then introduced the Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1983 on November 16,
1983. H.R. 4428, 98th Cong., IstSess., 129 CONG. REC. H10056 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Reform Act]. Since its introduction, 29 Congressmen have joined as cosponsors of the Reform Act. 130 CONG. REc. H962 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1984).
"Political action committee" (PAC) is the generic term for separate segregated funds set up
by labor organizations, trade associations, corporations, government contractors and banks.
It also encompasses political committees set up by clubs, associations, and other groups.
These differing entities fall under the definition of multi-candidate political committees if
they give to five or more candidates for federal election in an election cycle. 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(4) (1982). For the purpose of this note, "PAC's" refers to trade associations, labor
organizations, and corporations, regardless of ideological basis.
H.R. 2490, supra note 2.
H.R. 4428, supra note 2.
Pac'sSetting Recordin Gifts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1983, at 7, col. 3. (estimate by Fred Wertheimer of Common Cause.) The 130 largest PAC's increased their contributions 80% in 1983
compared to the prior non-election year of 1981. Jackson, PA4 C Funds Flowing to Congress,
Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1984, at 50, col. I Wertheimer's $100 million estimate conservatively
assesses a 22% increase which would be the smallest increase in PAC contributions since
1977-1978. See 9 F.E.C. Record 5-8 (June 1983). In total, candidates spent $343.9 million in
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Charges of vote buying, access buying, influence peddling and congressional inaction accompany this steady infusion of PAC funds. 7 This
clamor destroys public confidence in the Congress and in the election
process. The Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1983
constitutionally alleviates many of these apparent PAC abuses.
This note will review the legislative and judicial history of federal
campaign laws, consider present PAC expenditures and contributions,
examine the charges that the press and citizen groups have levelled
against Congressmen, outline the provisions of the Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1983, and consider the Act's
effectiveness.
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
Early legislation directed at campaign regulation consisted of ad
hoc efforts to confront perceived abuses in the electoral system. In the
last eighty years, 8 Congress has regulated election participation of public employees, 9 unions,"0 corporations, 1 government contractors, ' 2 na-

7.

the 1981-1982 election cycle, a 44% increase over the 1979-1980 cycle. Taylor, Inside. FEC
82 Spending Leaps Past Old Totals, Wash. Post, May 10, 1983, at A17, col. 2 (figures based
upon Federal Election Commission records). In 1983, a non-election year, House members
have already piled up $29.5 million towards their re-election. Forty percent of those donations to House members came from PAC's. See Jackson, supra.
See section of note entitled CHARGES OF VOTE BUYING AND ACCESS BUYING, infra for a
discussion of these charges. As the first session of the 98th Congress adjourned, various
members alleged that the inability to legislate was caused by the special interest money circulating in Congress. Magnuson, We're Unable to Act, TIME, Nov. 28, 1983, at 18-20.
See Address by former Rep. Richard Boiling, D-Mo., Boston College O'Neill Professor
of American Politics, in Newton, Mass. (Sept. 21, 1983) (hereinafter cited as Boiling Speech].
Boiling criticized the 97th Congress for the same inaction. "[Tihe corruption of special interest money has infected the legislative branch, and, partly as a result, I found myself serving
in the most gutless Congress I'd ever seen." Id. at 10.
Compare CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES: THEIR
EVOLUTION AND GROWTH AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 166

8.

9.

10.
11.
12.

(1982) (prepared by Joseph E. Cantor) [hereinafter cited as PAC's EVOLtrrION AND
GROWTH]. Cantor writes that the paralysis is only a perception, not actual. Interest groups
may not stifle Congress but instead force them to confront controversial issues.
The first comprehensive statute Congress enacted to regulate campaign finance was the Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, cod#fedby Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 83, 35 Stat.
1103, 1103-04. The Tillman Act prohibited national banks and corporations from contributing to federal election campaigns.
In 1925, the Corrupt Practices Act replaced the Tillman Act. The prohibitions were
nearly the same: to keep the banks and corporations from influencing the process through
contributions. The Corrupt Practices Act was the effective act until FECA replaced it in
1971. Act of Feb. 22, 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070, repealedby Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972).
The Hatch Act, passed in 1939, prohibited federal employees from participating in politics.
Ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939). It also prohibited the use of pension funds for political contributions. Congress amended the Act in 1940 to prohibit any contribution in excess of $5,000
to any candidate for federal office. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 1, 5, 18 U.S.C.).
As part of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress prohibited unions from making contributions to
federal candidates from the union's treasury fund. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat.
136, 159 (1947).
Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), repealedby Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972).
Government contractors were originally prohibited from contributing because of the impro-
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tional banks 3 and individuals. 14 At one time or another Congress
prohibited each of these groups from contributing to campaigns.

In 1972, Congress finally promulgated a comprehensive statute to
regulate election financing. The Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 (FECA) t5 limited the total amount federal candidates could spend
on media advertising, 16 restricted the amount federal candidates could
contribute to their own campaigns, 7 and required more complete disclosure of contributions and expenditures.'" FECA strove for self-enforcement: if a candidate accepted excessive contributions from certain
individuals, the contributions would become political fodder for his

opponent.
The 1971 Act disregarded earlier campaign financing legislation
which prohibited corporations and labor unions from contributing to
candidates.' 9 It allowed those entities to establish separate segregated
funds which could make contributions to candidates or expenditures on
behalf of candidates in compliance with FECA's limitations. 20 Congress intended these separate segregated funds to be voluntarily-financed political groups that could represent the interests of the
corporation or union, but would not be tied to the corporate or union
treasuries. The separate segregated funds evolved into today's PAC's.
After FECA, one obstacle impeded PAC formation for most large
corporations. Section 611 of the United States Criminal Code2 ' prohibited government contractors from making campaign contributions
priety arising when the contributor is an interested party. They had been prohibited from
making contributions even through PAC's. FECA now allows government contractors to
create separate segregated funds (PAC's) as any other corporation. 2 U.S.C. § 441c(b).
13. Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), repealed by Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 405, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972).
14. Hatch Act, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1, 5, 18
U.S.C.).
15. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18 and
47 U.S.C.).
16. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 104, 86 Stat. 3, 5 (1972) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 104), repealed by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 305, 88 Stat.
1263, 1278.
17. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203(a), 86 Stat. 3, 9 (1972) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(a)), repealed by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201, 90 Stat.
475, 496. Congress repealed this section in light of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51-54
(1976), which declared the limitations placed on expenditures by candidates from their own
resources unconstitutional.
18. Pub. L. No. 92-225, §§ 304-307, 86 Stat. 3, 14-16 (1972), amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 302, 88 Stat. 1263, 1289; Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 115, 90 Stat. 475, 495
(current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434-435 (1982)).
19. See Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (prohibition of corporate contributions); Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947) (prohibition of union
contributions).
20. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10, repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201, 90 Stat. 475, 496. The 1976 Amendments recodifled the separate segregated fund provisions and extended the use of such funds to
membership organizations, cooperatives, and corporations without capital stock. Pub. L.
No. 94-283, § 112(2), 90 Stat. 475, 490 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (1982)).
21. 18 U.S.C. '§ 611, repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-283, § 201(a), 70 Stat. 475, 496.
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to federal candidates. When TRW, Inc., a large government contractor, attempted to create a PAC in 1972, Common Cause22 sued and
forced the firm to dismantle its PAC. 23 Although the parties settled out
of court, the result held an omen for big business and labor unions with
government contracts. 24 "So labor and business closed ranks to lobby
for an amendment to end the restriction."2 5 The combined interests
succeeded in eliminating Section 611 in July 1973.26
When the Watergate scandal 27 revealed corruption in the highest
offices of the American government, Congress reacted by amending
FECA.2a The 1974 FECA amendments limited individual contributions to federal candidates to $1,000 per election 29 and PAC contributions to $5,000 per election.3" The amendments also extended aggregate
expenditure limits for congressional campaigns, 3 limited independent
expenditures to $1,000 per election, 32 and allowed government contractors to form PAC's. 33 The amendments also created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the campaign
finance laws.3 4
While Congress clamped down on election corruption, its newlycreated FEC opened the campaign financing door to corporations in its
Sun Pac advisory opinion.3 5 When Sun Oil proposed to spend general
corporate treasury funds to establish, administer and solicit voluntary
contributions to its PAC,36 SUNPAC, and to use general corporate
treasury funds to establish and administer a "trustee plan," SUNEPA,
which would channel participating employees' money from bank ac22.
23.

Common Cause is a Washington, D.C. based citizens' lobby group.
Common Cause v. TRW, Inc., No. 980-72 (D.D.C. filed May 15, 1972), dismissed Aug. 8,

24.

The AFL-CIO was concerned that the courts would categorize their manpower training pro-

1972.

grams as government contracts.
25. Green, PoliticalPac-Man, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 1982, at 18.
26. The Senate rejected an amendment, S.372, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., to the proposed Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1973, S.372, 93d Cong., IstSess., 119 CONG. REC.
26,613 (1973), which would have retained the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 611 prohibiting contributions by government contractors. 119 CONG. REC. 26,297-303 (1973).
27. During the 1972 presidential election campaign, members of the Republican National Committee authorized the bugging of the Democratic Party's headquarters in the Watergate Hotel. The scandal caused a public outcry regarding corruption in politics and eventually led to
the resignation of President Richard M. Nixon.
28. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§ 201-208, 88
Stat. 1263, 1272-1287 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-434, 437, 438 (1982)).
29. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(b)(l), 88 Stat. 1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(l)a(6)(2) (1982)).
30. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(b)(2), 88 Stat. 1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(l)-a(2)
(1982)).
Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(c)(l)(D), 88 Stat. 1263, repealedby Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
32. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(e)(l), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265, repealed by Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
33. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 103, 88 Stat. 1272 (codifledat 2 U.S.C. § 441c(b) (1982)).
34. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 310(a)(1), 88 Stat. 1280, amended by Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
35. Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinion 1975-1983, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975).
36. Id.
31.
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counts to candidates,3 7 the FEC concluded that as long as Sun Oil used
the funds only for the stated purposes and as long as SUNPAC and
SUNEPA remained separate and segregated funds,3 8 Sun Oil was abiding by FECA. The decision gave corporate PAC's a financial advantage over non-corporate PAC's.
Shortly after the 1974 amendments took effect, Senator William F.
Buckley (R-N.Y.), along with a handful of other individuals and political groups, successfully challenged several of FECA's provisions in
Buckley v. Valeo .9 The Supreme Court in Buckley held that the limitations on individual' and PAC contributions 4' and the disclosure requirements were proper means for combatting corruption or the
appearance of corruption which stems from large campaign contributions. 42 The Court struck down the limitations on aggregate campaign
expenditures, 43 on expenditures from a candidate's personal funds,'
and on independent expenditures. 45 The Court reasoned that campaign expenditures constituted protected first amendment speech and
that the government interest in alleviating corruption or the appearance
of corruption was not sufficiently compelling to warrant a limitation on
this protected 47speech. 6 Congress amended FECA in 1976 to comply
with Buckley.

PAC'S CURRENT CONTRIBUTION RECORD
In his dissent in Buckley, Justice White foresaw the results of the
majority's decision. 48 He realized that since the Court struck down the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.

Id.
Id. at 56,584, 56,585.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 60-84.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 55.
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 26 U.S.C.). See generally SENATE RULES AND
ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, REPORT TO ACCOMPANY S. 3605, S. REP. No. 677, 94th
Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 929.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 257. Justice White dissented from the Court's holding that
FECA's limitations on independent expenditures and on aggregate campaign expenditures
violated the first amendment. He criticized the plurality because they refused to defer to
Congress' practical opinion on the need for these two limitations. As to the limit on independent expenditures, Justice White reasoned that the Court had merely opened a loophole for circumvention of FECA's contribution limits which the Court simultaneously
upheld. Justice White stated, ". . . limiting independent expenditures is essential to prevent
transparent and widespread evasion of the contribution limits." Id. at 261-62 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White's prediction has proven accurate.
As to the limit on aggregate campaign expenditures, Justice White thought the Court
should defer to Congress' judgment. He noted that the purposes for expenditure limitations
are "legitimate and sufficiently substantial." Id. at 264. Justice White stated:
the expenditure limit imposed on candidates plays its own role in lessening the chance
that the contribution ceiling will be violated. Without limits on total expenditures,
campaign costs will inevitably and endlessly escalate. Pressure to raise funds will con-
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independent expenditure limits, it destroyed FECA's comprehensiveness and opened a loophole for PAC spending.4 9 Indeed PAC's have
become a major force in both campaign fundraising and in expendi-

49.

stantly build and with it the temptation to resort in "emergencies" to those sources of
large sums, who, history shows, are sufficiently confident of not being caught to risk
flouting contribution limits. Congress would save the candidate from this predicament by establishing a reasonable ceiling on all candidates. This is a major consideration in favor of the limitation. It should be added that many successful candidates
will also be saved from large, overhanging campaign debts which must be paid off
with money raised while holding public office and at a time when they are already
preparing or thinking about the next campaign. The danger to the public interest in
such situations is self-evident.
Id. (emphasis added).
Justice White further noted that FECA's aggregate expenditure limit would allow candidates, both incumbents and challengers, to spend more time in non-fundraising activities.
Justice White stated:
I have little doubt in addition that limiting the total that can be spent will ease the
candidate's understandable obsession with fundraising, and so free him and his staff
to communicate in more places and ways unconnected with the fundraising function.
There is nothing objectionable-indeed it seems to me a weighty interest in favor of
the provision-in the attempt to insulate the political expression of federal candidates
from the influence inevitably exerted by the endless job of raising increasingly large
sums of money. I regret that the Court has returned them all to the treadmill.
Id. at 265 (emphasis added). See Cox, ConstitutionalIssues in the Regulation af the Financing
of Election Campaigns, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 395 (1982). Professor Cox cites footnote 46 of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Federal Election Commission v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
to show that the Court seems ready to defer to Congress' determinations on the corruptive
influences in politics. Cox, supra, at 407, 413. Cox states that the Bellotti opinion, which
allowed corporations to expend money in referendums, reserved judgment as to the propriety
of corporate contributions to a candidate. Cox reasons that the Court's deference in Bellotti,
viewed in light of the opinion upholding section 441b of FECA in Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 552 (1982) shows a newfound committment to the "policy of giving considerable weight to the congressional findings
that implicitly underlie legislation regulating campaign contributions and expenditures."
Cox, supra, at 413. In NationalRightto Work, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[wihile § 44 l b restricts the solicitation of corporations and labor unions without great
financial resources, as well as those more fortunately situated, we accept Congress's
judgment that it is the potential for such influence that demands regulation. Nor will
we second guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures
where corruption, is the evil feared.
103 S.Ct. at 560.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261. (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Since FECA
limited both campaign contributions and expenditures, PAC's could not act as conduits for
money that the official committee could not receive. Without a limit on independent expenditures, FECA fails to achieve its basic goal, preventing money from influencing the legislative process. After Buckley, many races have two campaigns, the official candidate's
committee which PAC's support by contributions, and an unofficial, ostensibly independent
campaign that the PAC's run on the candidate's behalf.
In the past cycles, independent expenditures were more prevalent in the presidential campaigns. For example, in the 1980 presidential election $12 million of $14 million spent independently by PAC's went to the presidential race. Federal Election Commission, Press
Release (Feb. 21, 1982). Yet, in the 1981-1982 election cycle, PAC spending increased 143%
in the congressional races also. Eighty percent of the total expenditures in the 1981-1982
races were independent expenditures. See Federal Election Commission, Press Release
(Mar. 22, 1983).
PAC's circumvention of the spending limits through independent expenditures negates
first amendment protection instead of protecting it. PAC's, through their negative campaigns
not only express their opinions, they sway others. This illustrates an inequality in speech as
the individual voter has no input on an issue compared to the PAC interests. Note, Equalizing Candidates'OpportunitiesForExpression, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (1982). See Rembar, ForSale.- Freedom of Speech, THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 1984, at 25, 30.
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tures on behalf of candidates."0 The following chart5 ' illustrates increases in PAC contributions over the last three elections cycles:
Aggregate Amount
of Contributions
(in millions of dollars)
Percent increase over
previous year

1977-78

1979-80

1981-82

$35.2

$55.2

$87.3

57%

58%

Projections for the 1984 election cycle mirror the past growth.5" Al53
though some argue that the total number of PAC's has levelled off,
the existing PAC's are spending more heavily. 54 Since the present laws
allow for the creation of an unlimited number of PAC's,5 5 and those
that exist spend more, this rise in expenditures seems boundless.
Problems Caused by PAC Contributions

Political Action Committees inject money into campaigns through
two means: contributions and independent expenditures. The Federal
Election Campaign Act limits PAC contributions to candidates to
$5000 for the general election and $5000 for the primary election. 56 Independent expenditures, on the other hand, have no limitation because
they are constitutionally protected. 7 Yet the multiplicity of PAC's,5"
Top PAC figures for contributions in the 1982 election cycle were:
$2,115,135
Top Overall-Realtors PAC
454,150
Top Corporate-Tenneco
1,623,947
Top Labor-UAW Community Action Program
542,500
Top Ideological-National PAC (pro Israel)
Clymer, PAC Gifts to Candidates Rose 45% in Latest Cycle, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1983, § 1, at
16, col. 1.
51. Chart compiled from the following sources: Federal Election Commission, Press Release,
(Feb. 21, 1982); id., Apr. 24, 1980; id., Mar. 7, 1982. See also Clymer, supra note 50.
52. See discussion supra note 6.
53. See generall PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 7, at 211-15; Federal Election
Commission, Press Release, (July 28, 1983). From January 1, 1974 to July 1, 1983, the aggregate number of PAC's has increased from 608 to 3461. Between 1981 and 1983, the number
increased by 560, compared to an increase of 901 from 1979 to 1981. See PAC's EVOLUTION
AND GROWTH, supra note 7, at 55 for a detailed report on the growth of PAC's from 19721980. The following chart represents PAC growth by category from 1974-1983:
50.

Type

1974

201
Labor
89
Corporate
0
Ideological
* First Year After SunPac, supra note 35.

1977*

1983

234
550
110

380
1467
746

CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, MONEY AND POLITICS: CAMPAIGN SPENDING OUT OF

CONTROL 16 (1983).

54. See discussion supra note 6.
55. Under FECA, every corporate entity and union may form a PAC. The possibility also exists
for an unlimited number of ideological PAC's. See generaly 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(b)(2)(C),
441c(b) (1982).
56. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) (1982).
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 45.
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9 and their contributions given as a
their combination with lobbies,
"quid pro quo" for votes60 create the appearance of a corrupt Congress. 6 ' Furthermore, as increased PAC contributions drive campaign
costs upward, an "arm's race" mentality develops among the candidates that forces each candidate to spend increased hours and resources
on campaigning.62
Similarly, independent expenditures have grown dramatically since
58.

Since PAC's may only contribute a maximum of $10,000 per election cycle to an individual
candidate, the problem arises when five closely-aligned PAC's each give $10,000. The ideological committees have been challenged because of alleged coordination among the closelyaligned PAC's. These challenges did not succeed. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129
(1982). Challenges against more formal associations, such as the AMA, have fared better.
California Medical Association v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). The multiplicity problem did
not arise as a significant concern before Buckley because of the independent expenditure
limits. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTION REFORM,
SYMPOSIUM ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMIT-

ON ELECTION REFORM 17 (1975) (comments of Fred Wertheimer).
Common Cause figures show that more than half of the organizations that sponsor PAC's
also maintain Washington-based lobbying offices. Wertheimer, The PA C Phenomenon in
American Politics, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 603, 611 n.48 (1980).
For example, the National Educational Association (NEA) has a strong lobby to back up
its contributions to candidates. Interview with Joe Standa, Officer, NEA Political Action
Committee, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 18, 1983).
60. See infra notes 67.86 and accompanying text. "Quid pro quo" language traces to the Buckley opinion where the Court wrote:
To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quidpro quo for
potential officeholders, the integrity of our systems of representative democracy is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election
demonstrates that the problem is not an illusory one.
424 U.S. at 26-27 (per curiam) (footnote omitted).
The Court dismissed the possibility of a quid pro quo for independent expenditures
though. Id. at 45. However, Rep. Mike Synar, D-Okla., states, "[b]ut it would be naive in
the extreme to ignore the quid pro quo implicit in PAC contributions. That money is given
for a reason-that reason is to influence the legislative process." Contribution Limits and
Independent Expenditures.-HearingsBefore the Task Force on Elections, Committee on House
Administration, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
Echoing Rep. Synar is Sen. Thomas Eagleton, D-Mo., "It [PAC money] literally forces
members of Congress to go around hat in hand begging for money from Washington-based
special interest political action committees whose sole purpose for existing is to seek a quid
pro quo." Raines, Senators Weigh "Cures"Forthe PA CAddiction, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1983,
§ 2, at 6, col. 3. See also Hearings,supra at 9 (statement of former Rep. Robert Eckhardt).
Rep. Thomas Downey, D-N.Y., stated, "[y]ou can't buy a Congressman for $5,000. But you
can buy his vote. It's done on a regular basis." Isaacson, Running with the PA Cs, TIME, Oct.
25, 1982, at 20. For a general summary of votes challenged by PAC critics, see id. at 23-25.
See also FederalFinancingof CongressionalElections: Hearingson H R. l and RelatedLegislation Before the Comm on House Administration, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 216 (1979).
61. Hearings,supra note 60, at 2 (statement of Rep. Swift, D-Wash., Chairman, Task Force on
TEE

59.

Elections):

62.

Indeed, suspicion about the relationship between a Member's voting behavior and
the source of his campaign contributions has found its way to the floor of the House
and threatens to erode the presumption of good faith upon which the legislative process rests.
It is not enough to dismiss these calculations of voting behavior as overly simplistic, for it is the appearance of corruption, as much as its actuality, that threatens us.
Id. at 2.
The arms race analogy permeates the PAC debate so much that Rep. Jim Leach, R-Iowa,
calls the bills to control contribution limits "SALT" agreements between big business, labor,
and the ideological PAC's. Id. at 33 (testimony of Rep. Leach, R-Iowa).
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Buckley63 and SunPac.64 The independent expenditure loophole allows PAC's to expend large sums of a candidate's behalf, essentially
circumventing contribution limits. 65 Moreover, the FEC's narrowlyconstrued definition of "independent" belies any attempt to control coordination among PAC's and candidates' official committees.6 6 The
spending has created a furor in the popular press, on the floors of Congress, and in scholarly works. The specifics are, indeed, eyeopening.
CHARGES OF VOTE-BUYING
Corresponding to Congress' regulation of various sectors of the
economy in the mid 1970's, PAC contributions increased,67 resulting in
charges of PAC vote-buying and access-buying. A few examples of
these charges shed light on their general nature.
63. 424 U.S. 1.
64.
65.

Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinion 1975-1983, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975).
Many of the criticisms below, although centered upon contribution abuses, may be juxtaposed with independent expenditure abuses. Courts have twice struck down the most direct
limit on independent expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0. In Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455
U.S. 129 (1982) the Supreme Court in a 4-4 vote (Justice O'Connor not participating) upheld
the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that 26 U.S.C.
§ 9012(), which limits independent expenditures on behalf of a presidential candidate to
$1,000 per cycle, was not constitutional under the reasoning the Supreme Court employed in
Buckley. Recently, in Democratic Party of the U.S. v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, No. 83-2329, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1983) the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held section 9012(f) unconstitutional. The
court relied on Buckley's prohibition against restrictions on expenditures. 52 U.S.L.W. 2370.
From these cases it is clear that, in spite of Congress' findings, the Court will not adopt a
prophylactic measure to control expenditures. But cf. Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 552 (1982) where the Court states that it will not
"second guess a legislative determination as to the need for a prophylactic measure where
corruption is the evil feared." Id. at 560.
66. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1982) defines independent expenditure as follows:
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such candidate and which is not made
in concert with, nor at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, any authorized
committee or agent of such candidate.
Some commentators suggest that Congress should rewrite this definition and force the FEC
to improve its monitoring performance in this area. For example, a complaint filed with the
FEC by Common Cause on September 26, 1980, included a proposed checklist to be used to
determine if an independent expenditure effort was in fact separate from and not coordinated with a campaign. Included in the checklist were: membership of committees and
steering bodies; conscious parallelism of activities; indirect communications; interlocking
consultants, vendors, and suppliers; coordinated events; use of candidate's name; and use of
material provided by a candidate. Wertheimer & Huwa, Campaign Finance Reforms.- Past
Accomplishments, Future Challenges, 10 N.Y.U. L.REv. & Soc. CHANGE 43, 64 n.98 (1980).
67. One reason that contributions have increased so dramatically is that the corporations responded to increased government regulation of the 1970's by creating more PAC's to gain
access and aid their lobby efforts to control the regulations. Bernadette Budde, Political
Education Director for the Business Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC), concurs
with the above reasoning. Ms. Budde has written:
[a] clear pattern emerges when reviewing who does and who does not have a
Pac--the more regulated an industry and the more obvious an industry is a congressional target, the more likely it is to have a political action committee within the
association or within the companies which make up that industry.
Budde, Business PoliticalAction Committees, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAWS

9, 11 (M. Malbin ed. 1980).

1984]

Campaign Finance Reform Act

A recent example receiving popular attention involved the Avco
Corporation's M-1 tank-engine contract.6 8 In 1983, for the first time,
the House Armed Services Committee decided, upon the insistence of
Representative Addabbo (D-N.Y.), head of the House Military Appropriations Subcommittee, to solicit competitive bids for tank engines.6 9
Previously Avco had made all the engines. Avco's best bid, its third,
was twenty-one percent below the price the government had previously
paid for Avco tanks. Still, the bid exceeded the Garret Company's first
bid by $10,000 per engine."0 The final contract decision rested with the
full House.7 ' Representative Addabbo (D-N.Y.), the leader of the
competitive bidding movement, changed his floor vote a few weeks after receiving a $5000 contribution from Avco's PAC.72 Avco also contributed heavily to other members of the committee. In addition, Avco
gave certain members honoraria73 for speeches at its plants and vacations to Avco conventions. 74 Representative Addabbo's defection significantly affected the floor vote while Avco's other contributions sealed
68. See Jackson, "MakingFriends"Avco Corp. Makes Judicious Gifts to U.S. Congressmen, Wall
St. J., Oct. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
69. 129 CONG. REc. H5300 (daily ed. July 20, 1983) (statement of Rep. Addabbo, D-N.Y.). The
subcommittee opted for competitive bidding because Avco which had supplied all previous
M-I engines plagued the Army with slow production, cost overruns, and defective engines.
The Army supported the move to a second supplier for cost savings and superior defense.
Jackson, supra note 68. See also 129 CONG. REc. H5308 (daily ed. July 20, 1983) (statement
of Rep. Bates, D-Calif.). The estimated savings ranged as high as $35 million by 1990. 129
CONG. REC. H5308 (daily ed. July 20, 1983) (statement of Rep. Bates, D-Calif.).
70. Jackson, supra note 68.
71. The House considered an amendment by Rep. Dicks, D-Wash., to strike out section 107 of
the 1984 appropriation bill (H.R. 2969, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)) and did not allow competitive bidding on tank engines. 129 CONG. REC. H5298 (daily ed. July 20, 1983) (statement
of Rep. Dicks, D-Wash.). Section 107 resulted from an earlier House decision to preclude
competitive bidding after the House Subcommittee on Military Appropriations chaired by
Rep. Addabbo, D-N.Y., sought the bidding. Id. at H5300 (statement of Rep. Addabbo, DN.Y.).
72. Jackson, supra note 68. On the floor, Rep. Addabbo made the following comments,
I have been a prime mover for competition and, as a matter of fact, in our Defense
Appropriations Committee we asked the Army to look at the cost of second sourcing.
So it is with reluctance that I now rise to oppose this amendment because I feel that,
number one, we have the M- I tank, which is our main battle tank but it still has many
problems. And, as a matter of fact, the administration has reduced the number of
tanks in this year's budget.
We have a tank which goes 5 gallons to a mile-not 5 miles to a gallon but 5 gallons
to a mile-so there are problems. So we do not know whether we will be buying
tanks into the year 1995 and, therefore, there is going to be a limited number of engines. Until we have solved those problems, we should not be spending the money for
startup costs.
129 CONG. REC. H5300 (daily ed. July 20, 1983) (statement of Rep. Addabbo, D-N.Y.).
73. Honoraia are excluded from the definition of contribution under FECA. 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(8)(B)(xiv) (1982).
74. Aware of the movement for competitive bidding, Avco donated heavily in 1982-1983 as the
tank engine debate heated. In fact, its $60,000 in contributions for the first nine months of
1983 were equal to its total donations in 1982, an election year. Further, it contributed
$1,000 to Rep. Nicholas Mavroules, D-Mass., the day after he voted in subcommittee to
protect Avco's monopoly. Rep. Dave Daniel, D-Va., got $2,000 for speaking at the Avco
plant the day after the Army opened the competitive bidding. Rep. Bill Dickinson, D-Ala.,
received a $1,000 contribution the day before the House debate on the tank engines. Rep.
Dickinson is also the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. Rep.
Bill Chappell, D-Fla., the second ranking member of Rep. Addabbo's committee, received
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their victory.7 5
Another example of alleged PAC vote-buying and access-buying
occurred during the summer of 1983, when Congress considered the
repeal of the mandatory bank withholding tax required by the Tax
Equality and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198 1.76 In anticipation that
the repeal would make the agenda of the 98th Congress, commercial
banks stepped up their contributions during the 1981-1982 election cy-

cle.7 7 The bank PAC's, through a highly-organized campaign which
drew criticism from many members of Congress, succeeded in striking
down the withholding tax.78 The withholding tax constituted only one
issue of many that the House Banking Committee addressed during the

session. Other issues included guarantees for thrift institutions, banks'
entry into traditional brokerage businesses, and whether to raise bank

interest rates to compete with money markets.

75.
76.

77.

78.

$8,000 in speaking fees and $5,500 in campaign contributions from Avco. Jackson, supra
note 68.
Even the Army attacked the adoption of the Avco bid. James Ambrose, the nation's
second ranking civilian official, stated at a news conference on August 8th, "[tlhe appearance
is that it [the ban on competitive bidding] is special pleading legislation." Id., at 22, col. 2.
Avco's defenders stated that the $10,000 savings would evaporate because of start up
costs. See 129 CONG. REC. H5300 (daily ed. July 20, 1982) (statement of Rep. Addabbo, DN.Y.). However, Garrett's lowest bid included the start-up costs in its fixed price of $341,500
per engine. Jackson, supra note 68, at 22, col. 1; see also 129 CONG. REC. H5300 (statement
of Rep. Dicks, D-Wash.).
Rep. Addabbo's defection undermined the support for competitive bidding. As the original
supporter switched, so did many others. Jackson, supra note 68, at 22, col. I (comments of
Rep. Dicks, D-Wash.).
The bill that would withdraw the bank withholding tax was H.R. 2973, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REC. H2991 (daily ed. May 17, 1983). Amended by joint conference and agreed
to by the House, id. at H5815, 16 (daily ed. July 28, 1983), and the Senate, id. at Sll,051
(daily ed. July 28, 1983).
During the 1981-1982 election cycle, bank PAC's gave federal candidates over $4.3 million.
Noble, Critics Cite Bank's Aid In Elections, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1983, § 4, at 1, col. 6. The
chief House recipient, Rep. Fernand St. Germain, D-R.I., Chairman of the House Banking
Committee, received $53,150 during the cycle. Ten other Congressmen received over
$40,000 and 25 received $20-40,000. Clymer, Banks Speak Loudly, Carry a Big Stick, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 20, 1983, § 4, at 2, col. 3. Common Cause estimates bank PAC's gave $5.3
million in the 1981-1982 cycle, an increase of 79% over the 1979-1980 cycle. The increased
interest in the bank withholding issue prompted the rise. Common Cause, Press Release
(July 29, 1983). Eighty percent of the Republicans and Democrats who sponsored H.R. 2973
reported contributions from bank PAC's. In the House, 281 members received an average of
$2,483 from Bank Pac's. In the Senate, 41 members received an average of $7,881. Contributions by Bankers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1983, § 4, at 23, col. 3.
Since most Congressmen must borrow funds to meet the expenses of a political race,
banks are important financiers even if they do not make direct contributions. If they refuse
to make these crucial loans to a candidate (which may greatly exceed the $5000 FECA contributions limit), they can effectively stop his campaign. Id. Bank loans are not contributions under FECA if they meet the requirement of a regular loan. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(8)(A)(vii) (I-IlI) (1982).
The Bank PAC's and lobbies mounted effective mass mail drives aimed at Congress by including computer-generated post cards and pre-addressed letters to Congress. The volume
caused the hiring of many extra mailmen for Capitol Hill. Clymer, supra note 77; Noble,
supra note 77. Rep. Rostenkowski, D-Il1., Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
criticized the activity, "[w]e [the members of the Ways and Means Committee] are distressed
that the banking industry's campaign to combine misinformation with sophisticated mass
mailing techniques will become the tactical guide for others [special interests] who would
gain their ends by deception." 129 CONG. REC. H2922 (daily ed. May 17, 1983) (statement of
Rep. Rostenkowski, D-Il1.).
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Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.), upset by the Senate debate on the
withholding issue lamented, "let the poor wait while we take care of the
bankers. They have the political action committees."7 9 While PAC
supporters and defenders may debate the merits of Dole's comment, 80
his comment appeared widely in the press, clouding the merits of the
vote with charges of corruption. The press closely tracked the bank
PACs' activities during the first session of the 98th Congress.8 1 The
articles purported to unveil the corruptive influences that accompanied
the contributions. At the very least, the press reported the appearance
of corruption that surrounded the votes.
Two other votes which have sparked controversy involved the Federal Trade Commission's rule which required disclosure of known defects in used cars" and its rule regulating professionals under the
antitrust laws.8 3 Various studies have suggested a correlation exists between PAC receipts and these votes. 84 Correlations aside, many members of Congress clearly thought PAC money influenced other
members' decisions on their votes. 85 The press relayed this alleged cor79.
80.

Noble, supra note 77.
Senator Kasten, R-Wis., one of the leading proponents of the repeal effort, disagreed. "People don't give political contributions based on an issue, they give contributions for access,
and they give it to people with power." Id. Although he received few bank contributions in
the 1981-1982 cycle, Sen. Kasten added that he expected to receive them in the upcoming
cycle. Id.
81. See Contributions by Bankers, supra note 77. See also Noble, supra note 77; Clymer, supra
note 77.
82. 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1982). The Senate addressed the rule in S. Con. Res. 60, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 594 (daily ed. May 18, 1982). Both the House and the Senate voted
against the rule. 128 CONG. REC. S5402 (daily ed. May 18, 1982); id. at H2883 (daily ed.
May 26, 1982). This vote was the first under the two-house veto plan for FTC rules. Id. at
S5381 (daily ed. May 18, 1982).
83. The Federal Trade Commission's proposed rule would have included the professions under
the antitrust rules and regulations of 16 C.F.R. § 13 (1979).
84. Common Cause has monitored campaign spending and contributions since the early 1970's.
A Common Cause study, HUWA & METZINGER, TAKE $2,000 AND CALL ME IN THE MORNING, (1983), traces the AMA's campaign contributions and expenditures over the last three
election cycles. In the 1979-1980 cycle the AMA contributed $1,872,033 to Congressmen.
Id. at 1. In the 1981-1982 cycle, the AMA spent $2,132,888. In addition, the AMA spent
$337,000 on independent expenditures during the last three cycles. Id. See also Hearings,
supra note 60, at 128 (testimony of Jay Angoff, Staff Attorney, Public Citizen's Congress
Watch); Boling speech, supra note 7, at 6. Some members criticize PAC opponents for using
tautologic reasoning when they establish correlations between contributions and votes.
Some political scientists do not find this correlation between PAC contributions and congressional voting. Clymer, Influence of Political Action Groups Disputed, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24,
1983, § 2, at 25, col. 2. See also PAC's EVOLUTION AND GROWTH, supra note 7, at 170.
85. The comments of the members show a general disgust with the PAC's and their influence.
For example, Richard Boning states, "the used car dealers opposed the rule and, with their
PAC money persuaded Congress to veto it." Boiling Speech, supra note 7, at 6. The former
Congressman adds, "It]he only interest not represented by PAC funds in that fight were the
interests of the consumers and the general public." Id. at 8. In response to the used-car vote,
Sen. Slade Gorton, R-Wash., stated, "[tJhis is one issue where I am afraid it looks like campaign contributions just have had an impact." Hearings, supra note 60, at 97 (quoted in
statement of Fred Wertheimer).
The most telling comment came from Rep. Dan Glickman, D-Wash., "[ylou can argue
the merits of the used car decision one way or the other, but I recall on the floor of the House
a member commented to me. 'I got a $10,000 check from National Auto Dealers Association. I can't change my vote now."' Id. at 43.
On the floor, Sen. Larry Pressler, R-S.D., sponsor of the resolution to veto the act, noted
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ruption to the public.86
Charges of Access-Buying
Political Action Committees recently have begun changing their

contribution patterns. In their early years, PAC's contributed heavily
to congressional committee members and incumbents.8 7 In the 1982

election cycle, and in the first portion of the 1984 cycle, PAC's have
altered this pattern, contributing to freshmen members on a widespread
basis. In fact, during the first six months of 1983, freshmen attracted

86.
87.

that the "public debate [surrounding this resolution] has centered around the idea that cosponsors of this resolution are somehow influenced by campaign contributions. . . " Sen.
Pressler did not agree with this characterization. 128 CONG. REC. S5383 (daily ed. May 8,
1982).
Rep. Synar, D-Okla., expressed his disenchantment with Congress after many votes in
the second session of the 97th Congress were accompanied by high pressure PAC lobbying.
"We are evolving very quickly into the best Congress money can buy. You don't buy a
United States Congressman with a contribution, of course, but you do buy access, and access
is the name of the game." Clymer, PAC Money's Role in Congress Raises Suspicions, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1983, § I, at 20, col. 4.
See generally Isaacson, supra note 60, at 20-26; Hearings, supra note 60, at 139. But see
Lazarus, Pac Power? They Keep on Losing, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1983, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
PAC's target committee members to receive contributions because of their ability to sway
other member's votes.
At this point I would like to make it clear that to corrupt or greatly influence outcomes in congressional committees or sub-committees usually does not require obtaining the services of many members. Congressional committees are often narrowly
divided to begin with, and one or two subservient individuals may make a great difference in the outcome on very important legislation. The system is so fragile and
vulnerable that real purity is essential to consistent success for the public interest.
Bolling Speech, supra note 7, at 4. For example, consider Rep. Addabbo's vote on the Avco
bid. See Avco discussion supra note 68-75 and accompanying text; Isaccson, supra note 60.
A favored committee is the Merchant Marine & Fisheries Committee. This committee,
over the last two sessions, has considered some of the most significant shipping bills of the
last 50 years. A recent example is the Shipping Act of 1983. Concurrently, PAC money rolls
in, making the committee the most popular for PAC contributions in the first six months of
the 1984 cycle. Noble, PoliticalAction Group's Gits Focus on New Areas in House, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1. In the second session of the 97th Congress, the Merchant
Marine & Fisheries Committee passed a joint labor and management proposal that effectively allows price-fixing. In Committee, the bill passed 33 to 0, with the thirteen interested
PAC's donating $47,850 to the committee's members. Isaacson, supra note 60, at 24.
The committees below received the top aggregate PAC contributions in the first six
months of 1983:
PAC
Members Median PAC Receipts
Merchant Marine
Public Works
Small Business
Energy & Commerce
Interior
House Administration
District of Columbia
Veterans
Education & Labor
Post Office & Civil Service

$14,720
14,587
14,500
12,188
11,260
11,200
10,954
10,000
9,370
9,041

Noble, supra, at 16, cols. 2-3. See also Noble, supra note 77 (statements of Sen. Kasten, RWis.).
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88
three times the contributions of senior members.
The PAC's are responding to the pressures faced by all Congressmen, especially freshmen, to raise large "war chests" to counteract
those of their opponents. The pressures result from two sources: debts
from past campaigns and the need to raise money for the next election.
Freshmen, whose seats are traditionally unsteady, must move quickly
to counteract challengers in their next race. 9 This situation prompted
freshman Representative Torricelli (D-N.J.) to say:
The most disappointing part of being in Congress is the financial pressure. I'm not as good in my job as I could because I'm always worried
about money. Every minute I work on campaign funds is a minute I
should be using for the taxpayers.9 °
Not only have PAC's shifted their contributions away from incumbents, but they have also begun to actively seek out and help retire
debts of newly-elected members. Debt retirement is a Congressman's
primary concern during the months immediately after his election. 9
First, Congressmen often extend their personal resources to secure
loans to finance their campaigns. Many Congressmen arrive in Washington in desperate financial shape. 92 Second, an "unsafe" seat means
a tough challenge ahead so the members must begin anew to raise
money for their next campaign.93
The appearance created when a Congressman accepts money from

88.

Median contributions received by House freshmen for the first six months of 1983 were
$15,497. For all members, this median was $5,115. Congressmen receiving the most were
Rep. B. Richardson, D-N.M., $71,000; Rep. J. Bryant, D-Tex., $54,300; and Rep. R. Torricelli, D-N.J., $52,400. Shribman, House Freshmen Take the Money to Run, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1983, § 4, at 4, col. 4.
When Congress changed its committee selection procedures, freshmen found themselves
on more influential committees than in the past. Traditionally members with minor influence, freshmen now have a more significant impact on legislation. As a result, contributions
to freshmen have increased. See KEIM & BAYSINGER, supra note 67. Ironically, at their
orientation freshmen members of the 98th Congress established a goal to eliminate the influence of PAC money. See Shribman, supra.
89. Shribman, supra note 88, at col. 5-6. Sen. Alan Dixon, D-Ill., agrees with this characterization of the present situation. The present events give "new meaning to the words 'running all
the time.'" Even Senators who have six year terms find themselves raising money when the
next election is as far as three years away. Address by Sen. Dixon to the University of Notre
Dame White Scholars, at the University of Notre Dame Law School, Notre Dame, Indiana
(Nov. 19, 1983). See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 257, where Justice White correctly predicted this effect on campaigns.
90. Shribman, supra note 88, at 4, col. 4.
91. Seventy-five freshmen had total campaign debts of $5.3 million on Jan. 1, 1983. They managed to reduce those debts to $3.8 million by June 30, 1983. Shribman, supra note 88. See,
e.g., Jackson, Making Friends,Political Contributions Give Lawyer in Capital Considerable
Influence, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1983, at 17, col. 1. Total debts incurred by some Congress
members are staggering. Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, R-Mich., ended the 1982 election $773,000
in the red. Thirty-five others were over $50,000 in debt at the end of their campaigns. Wall
St. J., Feb. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
92. A candidate with a debt may have no alternative other than the Washington fundraiser. The
home district may be dry, forcing him to Washington-based PAC's and lobbyists for financial support. The need is increased by the personal nature of the debts, such as offering a
second mortgage on the candidate's home. Interview with Jim Sparling, legislative assistant
to Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, R-Mich., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 24, 1983).
93. See Shribman, supra note 88.
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a PAC that did not support him or, in fact, supported his opponent in
the past election, approaches corruption.9 4 This overt post-election access-buying, although not as widely popularized as other reported PAC
abuses, cuts to the heart of PAC intentions. Here, a PAC seeks a guaranteed ear, an ear not open to the common voter and obtained without
the risk of supporting a losing candidate. The PAC's motives become
clear when the Congressman receives his debt-retiring contributions
only after the House announces his committee assignment for the next
session. This influence buying derides the integrity of the Congress.
Organizations combine lobbyists with PAC contributions to effectively influence Congress. The PAC contribution opens the lobby
door.9 5 Since many of the highly organized associations have both lobbies and PAC's, 96 this combination has caused much controversy
among congressional members.97
These abuses have led to an increased belief that Congress is corrupted through campaign contributions. Public opinion polls show
that Americans are concerned that money taints Congress. 9 8 Congress
94.

95.

96.

97.
98.

Mr. Paul Baab of the ABA points out that since access is the ultimate goal of PAC's, debt
retirement carries with it pernicious influence. Here, an elected candidate, after receiving the
"proper" committee assignment, can draw quick PAC money. Mr. Baab recounts receiving
an invitation to a fundraiser which contained the words "seeking assignment on the (blank)
committee." Interview with Paul Baab, American Bar Association, in Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 24, 1983).
In the words of Robert McCandles, a Washington lobbyist, "[y]ou're not going to get in the
door of Congressman X, you're not going to get a full and complete hearing, unless you have
attended to his most pressing interest, and that is his re-election." Jackson, supra note 9 1.
Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, R-Mich., an opponent of PAC limits, agrees that most members are
more likely to listen to arguments made by lobbyists whose interests gave them money. He
also stated that it "invited suspicion" when candidates get more than one-third of their
money from PAC's. Rep. Vander Jagt received 53% of his campaign contributions from
PAC's in the 1981-1982 cycle. Clymer, supra note 85.
Professors Esmeier and Hollock, political scientists from the University of Central Florida
and Hamilton College, respectively, in their address on PAC's before the Midwest Political
Science Association, theorize that only the "high powered" PAC's cause the problems. Most
PAC's are like small "United Way campaigns"-mom and pop groups raising minimal
funds. The exceptions are the high powered PAC's with the Washington offices and lobbyists. The two reported that from 1977 to 1980 only 7% of the PAC's gave more than
$100,000. Clymer, supra note 84.
Many large, highly-organized PAC's, with these lobbying arms, justify their role by citing
the "mom & pop" PAC's. Interview with John "Terry" Dolan, NCPAC Chairman, in Alexandria, Virginia (Aug. 18, 1983). See also discussion supra note 59.
See Wertheimer, supra note 59. See also Hearings,supra note 60, at 40 (testimony of Rep.
Synar, D-Okla.).
Public opinion is extremely important in this debate. The appearance generated by the system is an important government interest upon which Congress may build regulations. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29, 38, 51, 54, 55, 58, 60-84.
See also Hearings, supra note 60, at 386 and following pages where polls are reprinted.
See Rep. Beryl Anthony, D-Ark., Press Release (June 8, 1983). Rep. Anthony cites Harris
polls showing an 82% public endorsement that those who contribute large amounts of campaign dollars have too much influence. Contra, survey by Civic Service Inc. (CSI)where
only 32.5% of the people believed PAC's should not be able to contribute to elections. Civic
Service Inc.,Attitudes Towards CampaignFinancing, Feb., 1983 (copies available from Civic
Service, Inc., St. Louis, Mo.).
To eliminate the appearance of corruption many members have chosen ways to remove
PAC funding taint. Rep. Barber Conable, R-N.Y., a member of the Ways and Means Committee since 1967, refuses any PAC contributions. Rep. Conable stated that she "chose to
eliminate any appearance of undue influence resulting from large contributions from indi-
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must address these concerns.9 9 The Congressional Campaign Finance
Reform Act of 1983 will limit the influence that special interest groups,
working through PAC's, have on the legislative process.
COORDINATION OF PAC'S AND PARTICIPATION BY
CONGRESSMEN IN PAC'S
Two additional PAC characteristics cause alarm: coordination
among PAC's and the role of legislators in PAC's. These PAC activities must be reviewed in light of the Buckley Court's determination that
no corruption arises from independent PAC activity because it is noncooperative and independent.
Coordination of PAC's
The original PAC concept rests upon independence: like-minded
individuals contribute their money to be donated to candidates who
share their ideas. The reality differs greatly. PAC's allegedly cooperate
at the directorship level and with staff members of candidates' official
committees. In some cases governing board members have shared concurrent appointments to the official campaign committee and to an independent PAC.l" ° PAC's share political vendors, direct mail
consultants, strategists and advertising agencies with candidates' official campaign organizations and other PAC's. l0' This results in duplividuals or others." Roberts, Moving to Limit the Impact of PAG's, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16,
1983, § 1, at 20, col. 4. Rep. Mike Synar, D-Okla., refuses any out-of-state PAC money.
Interview with Ms. Meg Portfino, legislative assistant to Rep. Synar, D-Okla., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 17, 1983). Rep. Jack Kemp, R-N.Y., refuses money from any group with
business before a committee upon which he serves. Rep. Dante Fascell, D-Fla., does not
take PAC contributions in excess of the total amount of individual contributions he receives.
Id.
In total, approximately thirteen percent of all Congress members control their intake of
PAC money. Roberts, supra. Many members who support PAC limitations feel throttled by
the practical politics: they need the money, and it will probably go to a challenger if they do
not take it. As Rep. Al Swift, D-Wash., Chairman of the Task Force on Elections stated,
"[u]ntil meaningful reform is achieved, we play by the rules of the game as they currently
exist." 1d.
99. Hearings, supra note 60, at 28 (testimony of Rep. Glickman, D-Kan.).
100. See Timberg, The P4C Business, a seven part article beginning in the Baltimore Sun, July 11,
1982, reprinted in Hearings, supra note 60, at 154-81.
Recently, President Reagan supporters have settled various charges with the FEC arising
out of the 1980 presidential campaign. The charges allege violations by Citizens for the
Republic (CFR) and the official 1980 Reagan election committee. President Reagan and
Edwin Meese created CFR with funds left over from the official 1976 Reagan election committee to raise funds for the 1980 campaign. Meese left his position with CFR in 1979 to
take a position with the official 1980 Reagan election committee, but remained as consultant
for CFR. Both committees conceded various violations in 1982 and have agreed to settle the
other pending case. See Gerth, Reagan Backers Act to End '80 Case, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1984, at 9, col. 1.
See Leach, A4Cs Americana, USA Today, May 1983, (Magazine), at 11, col. 3, where
Rep. Leach attacked the PAC governing board members. Rep. Leach claimed that in reality
PAC decisions are made at the top of the organization with little participation by the members. This facilitates cooperation among groups, especially if the groups share common governing board members or directors.
101. See Timberg, supra note 100; see infra notes 106-107. See generally Wertheimer & Huwa,
supra note 66.
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one run by the candidate and a second highly

organized campaign run "independently" of the official campaign.
Since the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits only the direct
consultation or coordination by PAC members with a candidate's authorized committee members, 0 2 informal cooperation among PAC's
continues on a widespread basis. The Business Industries Political Action Committee (BIPAC), the purported "bell cow" for the business
community's PAC's, makes few contributions.' 0 3 Yet, a BIPAC contribution brings many contributions to a candidate from other businessrelated and trade association PAC's."° 4 Similarly, the Chamber of
Commerce0 5 coordinates contributions among its state and local

affiliates.

Several ideological PAC leaders reportedly cooperate in the exchange of mailing lists, candidate selection, and general strategy.' 0 6 A
few influential men combined to start many of these PAC's. °7 The
FEC sued some of these PAC's charging that their link with the official
Republican Senate Election Committee and President Reagan's official
election committee through common directors violated FECA.0 8 Still,
much of the coordination takes place beyond the reach of the FEC.
The recent activities of Senator Heinz (R-Pa.) are most dis102. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (1982).
103. In the 1981-1982 cycle, BIPAC made only $202,000 in contributions. Interview with Bernadette Budde, Political Education Director for BIPAC, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1983).
104. Really Independent Expenditures, Wash. Post, May 18, 1983, at A26, col. 2; Lazarus, supra
note 86; Interview with Randy Huwa, Common Cause specialist on election finance, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 15, 1983). Similarly, national organizations like the AFL-CIO and
the Chamber of Commerce can bring in many contributions from smaller PAC's. These
groups publish lists of candidates so that like-thinking groups can concentrate their money.
The Chamber of Commerce even has a video version of its preferred candidates that its
distributes to local affiliates. Isaacson, supra note 60.
See also Hearings, supra note 60, at 30 (testimony of Rep. Glickman, D-Kan.); id. at 41
(testimony of Rep. Synar, D-Okla.). Although flattered by the position in which critics hold
her organization, Burnadette Budde denies its wide-spread influence. She does admit that
various groups, without the resources to rate candidates and research races, look to BIPAC
for guidance. Interview with Bernadette Budde, Political Education Director for BIPAC, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 24, 1983).
105. Isaacson, supra note 60.
106. The coordination among the ideological PAC's has been investigated and reported in a series
of articles by The Baltimore Sun. See Timberg, supra note 100. See also Hearings, supra
note 60, at 32 (testimony of Rep. Glickman, D-Kan.).
107. Hearings, supra note 60, at 35 (statement of Rep. Jim Leach, R-Iowa). See Davis, Conservatism in America, A Small Circle of Friends,HARPER'S, Oct. 1980, at 21, for a historical development of the New Right coalition during the election of 1980. Davis points to the role
played in the development by four conservative leaders, John Dolan, Richard Viguerie,
Howard Phillips, and Paul Wayrich. These men helped form the New Right coalition and
coordinated many of its activities, including those of various PAC's (NCPAC, Committee for
the Survival of a Free Congress, The Moral Majority, and others). Also, the article traces
Viguerie's success as the fundraiser and consultant for the various groups. Id. at 21, 22, 24.
The author alleges that weekly meetings by these men and the so-called Kingston Group,
resulted in coordination of conservative plans. Id. at 22.
108. See Jackson, Rep. Gus Savage's Campaign Panel Is Suedfor Failing to File U.S. Disclosure
Reports, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1984, at 44, col. 1. The FEC is filing another coordination suit
against NCPAC for its role in the 1982 campaign of former Rep. Bruce Caputo, R-N.Y., to
unseat Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, D-N.Y. Id.
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turbing. 1°9 Heinz created his own PAC to raise money for the special
election in Washington following the death of Senator Henry Jackson
(D-Wash.). Concurrently, he served on the Republican Senate Election Committee and the official election committee for Republican Senate candidates. 1 10 Senator Heinz also hired two staff members of the
Senate Committee to help start his PAC. Applying the consultation or
coordination standard in FECA to Senator Heinz's actions intimates a
violation of the Act.
Much of this PAC activity occurs beyond the pale of the press so it
goes unnoticed, but the appearance remains one of corruptive dealing.
The independence of the "independent" committee wanes when the
same governing board uses the same advertisers and mail consultants
to solicit the same mailing lists and to advocate the same position. This
duplication circumvents any meaningful contribution limits.
Role of Congressmen in PAC's
Senator Heinz's activities in creating his own PAC illuminate another area that smacks of impropriety. As a result of the Washington
political realities, some members have more influence than others and
can generate much larger campaign chests. Recently these members
have begun creating PAC's to collect money and distribute it to other
less-influential candidates. l I Congress must address whether it is
proper for a member to transfer his funds to another member, especially in light of charges2 that the members use the funds to buy favors
from other members. 1
The above activities technically circumvent FECA's coordination
and consultation provisions. Both the multiplicity of PAC's coordinated at the directorship level and the Congressman's participation in
PAC's, although technically within the statute, violate the intent of the
109. The Democratic Party challenged Sen. Heinz's activities. See GOP Group Broke ElectionFund Law, Democrats Assert, Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1983, at 3, col. 4. Both the treasurer and
the top political strategist of Heinz's PAC formerly held those positions for the official party
committee. Jackson, Group Formed by Sen. Heinz Aims to Pour Money into GOP Races,
Exceeding Limit, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 16, col. 1.

110. Heinz finally quit the official Committee because "the new group must be perceived as independent." Sen. Heinz Quits GOP's SenatorialCommittee, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1983, at 3,

col. 4. Even the similarity of the two committees' names drew criticism from members. Id.
111. Clymer, supra note 50. Sen. Jesse Helm's, R-N.C., National Congressional Club is perhaps

the most famous Congressmen's PAC. Others include Sen. Howard Baker's, R-Tenn., Republican Majority Fund and Sen. Edward Kennedy's, D-Mass., Fund For a Democratic
Majority. In response to NCPAC's excesses, Sen. Paul Tsongas, D-Mass., and Rep. Morris
Udall, D-Ariz., created Independent Action, a progressive PAC, which raised money to expend independently on behalf of House Democrats. Goldman & Fineman, The War ofthe
WolfP4C's, NEWSWEEK, June 1, 1981, at 38.
112. Rep. Waxman, D-Cal., an able fundraiser, reportedly distributed over $100,000 to various

members to facilitate the extension of the Clean Air Act. Tolchein, An UnvarnishedLiberal
Consolidatinghis Power, Working Profile: Henry .4. Waxman, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1983,
§ 1, at 18, col. 3. In the 1982 congressional election, some Democrats "starved" as others sat

upon war chests. Republicans on the other hand shifted money to needy candidates and cut
their electoral losses. Fialka and Farney, Ill-FocusedFunds, Democrats Trail GOP In Ability
to Direct Cash to Closest Races, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
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statute to insure that PAC's are independently organized groups of
like-minded individuals.
INCREASED COSTS OF CAMPAIGNS
In 1982, House candidates expended an average of $214,000.13
This figure reflects all congressional elections, even those in which the
incumbent held a relatively "safe" seat. In addition, some candidates
spent over a million dollars." 4 In part, this rise in campaign spending
resulted from increased reliance upon television and the rising costs of
traditional campaign media." 5 One of the most significant factors in
the growth of spending appears to be the increased funds available to
candidates. 6
In the House, the rapid push for campaign funds creates a permanent election machine." 7 Even with the Senate's six-year term, the
members feel the effects of the "arms-race" mentality. The infusion of
PAC money has added "new meaning to the words 'running all the
time.'

"1118

The effect of increased spending and PAC contributions accentuates the need to "run all the time" among freshmen members. Many of
these members raised large sums to defeat incumbents. Finding themselves in "unsafe" seats, they must accumulate large campaign "war
chests" to gain re-election. Since PAC's constitute the most convenient
and most available means for raising money, the freshmen of the 98th
Congress failed to accomplish their pre-term goal to reduce PAC

money and influence." 9
The prospect of losing a race pressures incumbents to spend much
of their time on campaign fundraising long before their next election.
A well-funded incumbent will not lose an election unless he glaringly

113. In 1974 the average congressional race cost $50,000. In 1980 the average congressional race
cost $150,000. Isaacson, supra note 60, at 21.
Median Expenditures on House Campaigns

114.
115.
116.

117.
118.
119.

1982

1980

Percent
Increase

House

$ 214,267

$ 145,292

48

Senate

$1,746,230

$1,031,227

69

Clymer, Campaign Costs Soaras Median Spending For Senate Hits 31. 7 Million, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 3, 1983, § 1, at 20, col. 1. Interestingly, winners increased spending at a far greater rate
(75%) than the losers. Id.
Clymer, supra note 113. The highest House expenditure was $1.6 million, while the highest
in the Senate was $7 million.
Id. See also Hearings, supra note 60, at 6 (testimony of former Rep. Robert Eckhardt).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265 (White J., dissenting). Rep. Beryl Anthony, D-Ark., stated, "I
do believe that escalating costs can be attributed, in no small part, to the growth of PACs and
the money PACs contribute to political campaigns." Rep. Beryl Anthony, Press Release,
.supra note 98. See Leach, supra note 100, at 10, 11.
Hearings, supra note 60, at 6 (testimony of former Rep. Robert Eckhardt). See generally
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265 (White, J., dissenting).
See Address by Sen. Dixon, supra note 89.
Shribman, supra note 88.
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errs. If, as some observers believe, a challenger must raise over
$500,000 to make a legitimate run under the present system, an incumbent can easily insure his seat by raising an equal amount.' 20 An incumbent's visibility and congressional privileges widen the funding
margin. Political Action Committees favor incumbents because they
are a "known" quantity. 12 This favoritism cements the incumbents'
relative advantage over challengers. If Congress fails to control candidates' campaign expenditures, the races will become increasingly expensive and much more time-consuming as election pressures force
each candidate to raise more money. 122
This "scheming" detracts from a Congressman's appointed duties.' 23 Reforms should focus on reducing the time spent campaigning
so Congress can more effectively legislate. According to some, future
campaign financing reforms must decrease the time
24 spent campaigning
so that Congress may function more efficiently.1
The above paragraphs outline various pernicious aspects of PAC
contributions, including the public's perception of corruption. Congress has the power to legislate to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption. The Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act
of 1983, discussed below, offers many alternatives to alleviate PAC's
pressure on Congressmen.
THE CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM ACT OF 1983
The Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1983, H.R.
4428, contains three major provisions which when taken together curtail the influence of special interest groups on the election progress,
which, in turn, should curtail their influence on the legislative process.
First, the Reform Act limits the aggregate amount which a candidate
for the House of Representatives can receive from PAC's to $90,000 per
election cycle.' 25 Second, the Reform Act provides for free reply
27 by an independent expenditure. 12 8
time 12 6 to any candidate targeted
Third, the Reform Act gives an individual a 100% income tax credit for
120. Interview with Jim Sparling, senior legislative assistant for Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, R-Mich.,
in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 24, 1983).
121. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
122. Hearings, supra note 60, at 6.

123. Former Rep. Robert Eckhardt testified before the Task Force on Elections that, "some of
them [my colleagues] spent four days a week in politicking rather than the duties they were
required to do in Congress." Id. at 6. Not only do Congressmen spend inordinate amounts
of time on their campaigns but so do the full-time staff members in most offices. Many
Congressmen carry the maximum two full-time fundraisers that House rules allow. Interview with Mr. Jim Sparling, senior legislative assistant to Rep. Guy Vander Jagt, R-Mich., in
124.
125.
126.
127.

Washington, D.C. (Aug. 24, 1983). See also, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 265 (White, J., dissenting).
Interview with Paul Baab, supra note 94.
Reform Act, supra note 2, § 7.
Id. § 10.
Id.

128. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (1982).
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any contribution
of no more than $100 made to a qualified candidate
29
for Congress.
Some of the Reform Act's various provisions apply to those candidates who voluntarily join the tax credit system, while others apply to
all candidates. The provisions dealing with PAC contributions 30 and
independent expenditure reply time 13 1 apply to all candidates, regardless of their involvement in the tax credit system. 3 2 The tax credit system itself contains numerous conditions with which a candidate must
comply in order for the candidate's contributors to obtain the tax
credit. 33 These conditions apply only to those who have chosen to participate in the tax credit system. 134 A closer examination of the Reform
Act's three main provisions follows.
Limits on Aggregate PAC Contributions

The Reform Act focuses on limiting the influence of special interest
groups, working through PAC's, on the legislative process. 35 By limiting the aggregate amount which a candidate may accept from all
PAC's, the Reform Act's sponsors hope to ease the pressure which
PAC's can direct to a specific issue. 136 Under the current law, even
though a PAC contribution limit of $5,000 per candidate per election
129.
130.
131.
132.

133.
134.

135.

136.

Reform Act, supra note 2, § 2.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 10.
The aggregate limit on PAC contributions can be imposed on all congressional candidates
for it is a valid exercise of congressional power. The Supreme Court in Buckley upheld
FECA's $5,000 limit on PAC contributions to congressional candidates. 424 U.S. at 35-36.
A $90,000 aggregate limit on what PAC's can contribute to a candidate is merely an extension of this $5,000 contribution limit. The corruption or appearance of corruption which the
Court found sufficient to justify the $5,000 limit is also sufficient to warrant a $90,000 aggregate PAC contribution limit. See Wertheimer, supra note 59, at 619-25.
The Buckley Court held that FECA's limits on independent expenditures violated the
first amendment. 424 U.S. at 51. Thus, Congress cannot impose a limit on independent
expenditures. Congress can, however, protect independent expenditure targets by providing
a target with free reply time or reduced rate postage. Rather than curtailing speech, these
provisions enhance it. Consequently, the Act's provisions regarding independent expenditure reply time apply to all congressional candidates, not just those who have voluntarily
joined the tax credit system.
Reform Act, supra note 2, § 3.
Two of these conditions are limits on aggregate campaign expenditures and on the expenditures of a candidate's personal funds. Thus, Congress cannot constitutionally impose these
two restrictions on a candidate. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-58. Congress can, however, condition the availability of a tax advantage on the candidate's acceptance of these two expenditure limitations. The Reform Act offers a 100% tax credit to individual contributors of a
candidate who have voluntarily joined the tax credit system. The Reform Act's sponsors
hope that this tax credit will induce a majority of candidates into the tax credit system.
Rep. David Obey, D-Okla., Press Release (Apr. 11, 1983). Rep. Obey wrote:
What we are trying to do is equalize as much as possible the legislative playing
field so that the legislative process is not warped by the combined effect of organized
political contributions. . . . Particularly when a large number of groups which have
made substantial contributions to members are all lobbying on the same side of an
issue, "the pressure generated by all these contributors is enormous and it warps the
process. It creates the politics of intimidation."
Id.
Id.
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exists, 137 the number of PAC's that may align to back a specific candidate allows tremendous influence to be exerted. 138 For this reason, the
Reform Act places
an aggregate limit on what a candidate may accept
139
from PAC's.

Specifically, the Reform Act provides that a candidate for the
House of Representatives and his authorized committee shall not accept contributions aggregating more than $90,000 in any calendar year
from PAC's.140 The Reform Act further provides that a contribution
made in the year before the calendar year in which the election is held,
is considered to be made during the calendar year in which such election is held. 4 Thus, contributions received during "off" years,
whether for a primary or a general election, will make up part of the
$90,000 aggregate. A contribution made after an election day shall be
considered a contribution with respect to such election only if the contribution 42is used to pay obligations incurred with respect to such
election.

Independent Expenditure Provisions
The aggregate limit on PAC contributions curbs the influence of
special interest groups on the congressional decisionmaking process. A
limit on PAC contributions with nothing more would only divert special interest money to other forms of political influence peddling, the
most obvious of which is independent expenditures. 4 To avoid redirection of PAC pressure, the Reform Act contains provisions which
make independent expenditures an unattractive choice for channelling
money into the campaign process.
The Reform Act provides that any licensee 44 of the Federal Communications Commission which allows an independent expenditure to
be made through a broadcast by its station must allow the targeted candidate the opportunity to use the same amount of time, during the same
time of day, without charge.' 45 For those independent expenditures
not made through radio stations-for example, television commercials
or newspaper advertisements-the Reform Act allows the targeted can137. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2) (1982). Thus $5,000 may be contributed in both the primary and general elections.
138. See discussion supra note 55.
139. See Reform Act, supra note 2, § 7.
140. Id. FECA already provides for such an aggregation scheme. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (1982).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Independent expenditures have increased dramatically in proportion to PAC contributions.
As much as 80% of PAC expenditures are independent expenditures on behalf of candidates.
Federal Election Commission, Press Release (Mar. 22, 1983). John "Terry" Dolan of
NCPAC confidently confirms that the money is there and will always find a place to be
spent. Interview with John Dolan, Chairman of NCPAC, in Alexandria, Virginia (Aug. 21,
1983).
144. "Licensee" is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 153(c) (1976) to mean "the holder of a radio station
license granted or continued in force under authority of this chapter."
145. Reform Act, supra note 2, § 10.
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didate to use a special postage rate up to the amount of the independent expenditure against him. 46 Thus, the Reform Act mitigates the
effect which independent expenditures can have on the legislative
process.
In order to give candidates notice of the independent expenditures
being spent against them, the Reform Act also requires anyone who
makes independent expenditures to notify the Federal Elections Commission and the candidates involved in the particular election within
forty-eight hours after such expenditures total more than $5,000 and
47
thereafter each time additional expenditures total $2,500 or more.'
This provision assures all targeted candidates adequate notice before
election day to plan the use of the free reply time made available by the
Reform Act.
Tax Credit System
The aggregate limit placed on PAC contributions diminishes a major source of campaign funds. To help replace this source, the Reform
Act encourages individual contributions by giving a 100% tax credit for
contributions of up to $100.14 For a candidate's contributors to receive
the credit, however, a candidate must meet certain threshold requirements 149 and then agree to comply with several restrictions.' 0 Additionally, the Reform Act provides significant support to candidates who
have elected to qualify for the tax credit system with its attendant restrictions but whose opponents have not opted to be a part of the
system.151
Candidates must raise a threshold amount of $10,000 from individ1 52
ual contributions of $100 or less to qualify for the tax credit system.
Once this threshold has been met and the candidate has qualified for
the election ballot, 15 3 the candidate may voluntarily elect to enter the
tax credit system.' 54 With this election the candidate must also agree to
limit expenditures of personal funds, including immediate family members, to $20,000 155 and limit total expenditures to $240,000.156
If the candidate agrees to meet the above requirements, his contrib146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. § 3.
Id.
Id. § 2.
Id.

150. Id. § 3.
151. Id.

152. Id. §§ 2, 3.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. § 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 8. Additional requirements which a participating candidate agrees to undertake include: providing contribution and expenditure records to the FEC, cooperating with the
FEC in the case of an audit; keeping all contributions for which a tax credit was allowed in a
separate checking account; and using the separate checking account to pay bona fide campaign expenses. Id. § 3.
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utors receive a 100% tax credit for contributions of up to $100. 157
Those contributions which make up the threshold amount do not qualify for the credit.'5 Thus, small individual contributors of a candidate
who elects to enter the tax credit system receive an additional incentive
to assist the campaign.
The most drastic provisions of the Reform Act become effective
when only one of the candidates elects the tax credit system.' 59 In such
a case, the non-participating candidate would have no retrictions on
overall campaign expenditures or expenditures from personal or family
funds. 160 Rather than handicap the participating candidate, the Act
removes the $20,000 personal or family expenditure limit 6 I and the
$240,000 overall expenditure limits 62 on his campaign. 63 The Act also
provides that the participating candidate is entitled to mail campaign
literature at a special postage rate. " The sponsors of the Act hope that
the special postage rate, coupled with the increase in small individual
contributions occassioned by the 100% tax credit, will induce a majority
of candidates to elect the tax credit system.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Buckley stated that the elimination of corruption or the appearance of corruption in congressional campaigns is
a legitimate government interest. In the years since the 1976 decision,
examples of corruption or the appearance of corruption have been
widespread. This article has examined a few questionable activities
which occurred during the First Session of the 98th Congress. The
press reported each of these instances to the public and some of them
created a scandal.
The Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1983 attempts to curtail the influence of special interest groups, working
through PAC's, on the legislative process. First, the $90,000 aggregate
limit on PAC contributions curtails candidates' reliance on PAC
money. This, in turn, curtails the possibility of a quid pro quo. The
void left by the PAC contribution limit should be filled by small individual contributions of $100 or less, which are encouraged by the tax
credit system. Second, the $240,000 aggregate limit on all contributions
curtails the amount of time which a candidate must spend fundraising.
This, in turn, allows the incumbent to spend more time actually performing his legislative duties. The 100% tax credit system should provide individuals with sufficient incentive to make contributions so that
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
.162.
163.
164.

Id. § 2.
Id.
Id. § 3.
Id.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 8.
Id. § 3.
Id.
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candidates can reach the $240,000 limit. Third, the free reply time and
special postage rate for targets of independent expenditures discourages
individuals and PAC's from circumventing FECA's contribution limits.
The current law is obviously inadequate because it limits a PAC to
making a $5,000 campaign contribution while allowing it to spend an
unlimited amount "independently." The quantum of access which can
be bought with a $50,000 or $100,000 independent expenditure campaign reeks of the appearance of corruption. The Reform Act's provisions regarding independent expenditures will successfully discourage
such spending without infringing upon this protected speech.
On the whole, the Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act of
1983 reduces the amount of time which a candidate must spend fundraising, lessens the escalating cost of congressional campaigns, curtails
the candidate's dependency on PAC funds for campaign financing, alleviates the possibility of a quid pro quo, and finally, removes the incentive for the coordination of PAC's in making independent
expenditures. Each of these effects will decrease actual corruption or
the appearance of corruption in congressional campaigns. Congress
should enact the Congressional Campaign Finance Reform Act to help
restore public confidence in American government.
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